INTRODUCTION
Is stabilization from high inflation contractionary, neutral or expansionary? Traditional wisdom used to say the first; conventional wisdom has drifted partially towards the second; recent theory and events may suggest the third. This paper finds that the phenomenon of short-run output expansion during disinflation from high initial levels is surprisingly widespread.
Growth is negative during high inflation, but positive afterwards and Drazen, 1991) . A corollary of the Alesina-Drazen model is that stabilization occurs only when the output losses from inflation (or the output gains from stabilization) become high enough to induce one interest group to bear the fiscal costs of stabilization. This has the intriguing empirical implication that inflation stabilization will be delayed until such a time as stabilization will lead to a strong growth improvement, possibly even in the short run. A closely related possibility is that only a severe crisis like a high inflation could break a war of attrition over reforms, so that such crises could actually be beneficial (i.e. raise growth) over some horizon (Drazen and Grilli, 1993) . The literature on cleansing recessions (e.g. Aghion and Saint-Paul, 1993) suggests a beneficial effect of crises without reference to political economy.
The theoretical and empirical uncertainty summarized in the preceding paragraphs indicates that going down the welltrodden inflation and growth path is still worth the trip. Moreover, recent events have kindly provided researchers with a bumper crop of new high-inflation and stabilization experiences. These range from the finally successful stabilizations in chronic inflation countries like Argentina and Peru, to the outbreak of high inflation in many of the ex-Communist countries, a few of which have since managed to stabilize. The case study literature has indeed already yielded many insights from detailed examination of individual cases. But it could usefully be supplemented by a more systematic examination of the data to ascertain which stylized facts generalize beyond individual cases. Michael Bruno and I took this approach in a previous paper (Bruno and Easterly, 1995) , where we examined all episodes of inflation higher than 40% in the global dataset. We found a surprisingly robust pattern. Per-capita output growth is sharply negative during episodes of high inflation. But after the inflation crisis ends, output growth is even higher than the pre-crisis growth. These findings are robust to a number of checks, as well as controlling for exogenous shocks such as wars. We did not attempt to resolve the difficult issue of direction of causality in that paper (nor will I attempt it in this paper). We viewed our exercise as a way to pin down more firmly the stylized facts, and hence to narrow the set of models consistent with the data. But our focus was on the medium-run growth performance after the ending of a high inflation, and hence we did not address the short-run consequences of inflation stabilization. In this paper, I use an updated and extended version of our dataset to try to shed light on the very different question of whether inflation stabilization is associated with output expansion even in the short run.
BASIC FINDINGS
I first provide some definitions, next present the central findings, and then subject them to robustness checks.
Definitions
I follow the Bruno and Easterly (1995) definition of a highinflation crisis as a period when inflation is above an annual rate of 40% for two years or more; the crisis period ends when inflation is below 40% for two years or more. Bruno and Easterly (1995) showed that this breakpoint, admittedly somewhat arbitrary, was successful in discriminating between periods of very high inflation and moderate to low inflation. The distinctions in average inflation between our crisis and non-crisis periods were sharp: 155% per annum during 'crisis' periods and 20% per annum during 'non-crisis' periods in the same countries. A 'stabilization episode' is defined as a movement from the 'inflation crisis' period to a 'non-crisis' period; each period must be a minimum of two years. The two-year minimum is used to eliminate spikes in inflation due purely to one-time price shocks like devaluations, imported oil price increases, or price liberalizations. Hence, stabilizations are all episodes in the cross-country data of movement from two years or more of above 40% annual inflation to two years or more of below 40% annual inflation.2 Ex-Communist countries are excluded from the sample, because their output behaviour seems sui generis to the transition experience. However, I will consider the ex-Communist countries in the last section, and we will see that their experience actually does conform to the behaviour of the general sample.
2For previous examples of the kind of episodic analysis used in this paper, see Kamin (1987) Clearly some objective criterion is needed to prevent such game playing. Inflation stabilization plans are sometimes announced with a great fanfare, and I could set the beginning of the stabilization episode at the date of such announcements; this is the approach adopted by Kiguel and Liviatan (1988, 1992a,b) and Vegh (1992; continued in Calvo and Vegh, 1994, and Reinhart and . This approach works well with the dramatic Southern Cone and Israeli exchange-rate-based stabilizations that those authors cover. It is much more problematic with money-based stabilizations. Anyone following Russia's long and winding road towards stabilization over the last four years would be hard pressed to say when 'the' stabilization effort began. Results are always scarcer than promises. This paper chooses a transparent, results-based measure of the beginning of a stabilization. I define the peak year for 3This description of the Reaganomics debate is based on Krugman (1994) . inflation prior to the stabilization as year 0. The year after the peak will be year 1 of stabilization. I will keep counting poststabilization years until the period ends or until a new inflation crisis (above 40%) develops. Pre-stabilization years are numbered as far backwards as the high-inflation (above 40%) period extends.
In the empirical application, I use end-of-period inflation for the years before and after the 28 stabilization episodes that satisfy these criteria in the available international data on inflation for 1960-94.4 The episodes include well-studied cases like Israel as well as those in the Southern Cone -Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay. However, the inflation crisis criterion also picks out a number of less well-known African and Asian cases. All of the inflation crises are in developing countries with the exception of two little-known crises in Iceland, which seems to form a kind of Northern Cone. sample. The median inflation rate declines steadily from a peak of about 100% to about 20% by year 4 in the sample of stabilizations. The mean is much higher, with a peak of over 1000%, because the distribution of inflation has a well-known skewness to the right. This skewness shows up here in the form of four full-blown hyperinflations in the data -Argentina, Bolivia, Nicaragua and Peru. Aggregate GDP growth is around 2% per annum during the earlier years of the high inflation; growth then dips near zero or below in the last three years before the peak inflation. Per-capita growth is zero and then sharply negative in the period before stabilization, with a deep trough in the year before peak inflation. Discussions of output behaviour during stabilization often curiously omit discussion of this below average growth performance in the years of high inflation before stabilization. The sharp trough immediately before peak inflation and then stabilization could be a tantalizing hint of the Alesina-Drazen and Drazen-Grilli war of attrition stories -things have to get very bad before someone takes action and stabilization gets going. It is a little puzzling that the growth trough comes in year -1 rather than year 0, although we will see that the timing of this trough is not completely robust.
Central findings
Median and mean real GDP growth is well above zero in the first year that inflation falls. When the literature labels a stabilization as 'contractionary', it usually means that GDP goes down contemporaneously with a reduction in inflation. Following this terminology and leaving causality aside, one would have 5The source of information on growth is the World Bank National Accounts database, which is based on the United Nations National Accounts reporting system. Again, entries for countries identified as inflation crisis countries are updated or filled in as necessary from IMF and World Bank staff reports. It need hardly be said that data for both inflation and growth for these countries are likely to vary greatly in quality, with data for the lowerincome economies being particularly questionable. where n is the last pre-crisis year (i.e. the last year before the country entered annual inflation above 40%). Growth is sharply below the world average and the pre-crisis growth rate during the high-inflation crisis. In the first year of stabilization, growth returns to both the world and pre-crisis country average. In the second and later years, growth is above the world and pre-crisis averages, as found over the medium run by Bruno and Easterly (1995 Excluding the big Uganda outlier reduces the mean per-capita growth in year 1 considerably, from 1.5% to 0.5%. The differences in growth in years 1 or 2 from the world averages or precrisis averages in the right-hand columns of Table 1 are also not significant. This lack of significance has a different interpretation from that for per-capita growth, since now it means that the stabilizing countries in years 1 or 2 were not growing any more slowly than the world average, or than their pre-crisis growth relative to the world average. I also look at the change in growth from the one or two years before/during peak inflation to the one or two years after inflation declined. The change from the peak year to year 1 is not quite significant, but the swing for two-year or three-year periods is strongly significant (see Table 1 Harberger apparently pointed out that real growth rates during periods of declining inflation were respectably positive (I say 'apparently' because this section of Harberger's paper was omitted from the published version and can only be inferred from Dornbusch's comments). Dorbusch criticized Harberger for the 'amazing conclusion that even during disinflation growth performance was laudable' (p. 466), suggesting that he should also have included the year before inflation declined. As we have seen, Dornbusch's criticism would not change the confirmation of Harberger's basic finding in my dataset; nor is the year before declining inflation strongly supported as year 1 of stabilization by the evidence in my dataset. Harberger (1988) reaffirmed his finding in a later study of five inflation episodes (as well as finally describing for publication, albeit still rather tersely, the original finding that turned out to be based on ten inflation episodes).
UNDERLYING COMPONENTS OF OUTPUT BEHAVIOUR
In this section, I will discuss the supply side of output behaviour (total factor productivity), the demand side (consumption), fiscal and monetary trends, and the effect of war and debt crises.
Capital and productivity
How much of the growth pattern before and after the fall in inflation is due to changes in capital growth, as opposed to capacity utilization or total factor productivity ( Table 1 . (In effect, this involves calculating the averages for the countries experiencing war and inflation crises relative to other countries at war but not involved in inflation 9The eight missing episodes occurred in six countries, some of which may have had exogenous reasons why they were not prime candidates for debt crises (or they had debt rescheduling later) -Bangladesh, Ghana, Iceland, Israel, Somalia and Uruguay. crises). Table 2 indicates that dummies for war and debt rescheduling are indeed highly significant and negative. However, the pattern of output expansion with declining inflation is actually stronger than before: per-capita growth is now significantly positive in year 1 after controlling for debt and war, regardless of whether the extreme Uganda war and recovery is included. 0
TWO OTHER POSSIBLE STORIES
This section examines two other possible explanations for the expansionary stabilization phenomenon by examining the patterns within the set of stabilizations: (1) Is the phenomenon driven by temporary booms following exchange-rate-based stabilizations? (2) Is it just a recovery following a large one-time shock to the level of output?
Exchange-rate-based versus money-based stabilizations
A large literature (reviewed in section 2) discusses the pattern of output behaviour associated with exchange-rate-based stabilizations (ERBS). The stylized fact emphasized in this literature is that there is an initial expansion after an ERBS, followed by a later contraction (Kiguel and Liviatan, 1992b; Calvo and Vegh, 1994; Rebelo and Vegh, 1995). Money-based stabilizations, in contrast, are said to have an initial contraction, followed by a later contraction. The main purpose here is not primarily to confirm or refute these stylized facts, which were intended to describe a particular set of chronic inflation countries in Latin America (counting Israel as part of Latin America for the moment). Rather my purpose is to examine whether such stylized facts underlie the patterns detected here in a broader sample of inflation stabilizations. Does the output expansion in years 1 and 2 in this paper reflect mainly the booms during exchange-rate-based stabilizations?
I classify stabilizations as exchange rate based if they are so classified by Calvo and Vegh (1994) . For those in this sample that are not covered by Calvo and Vegh (1994), I checked ' I also experimented with a terms-of-trade change variable, but it had no effect on the pattern of output decline and recovery during and after high inflation.
World Bank and IMF reports (and OECD surveys in the case of Iceland) to discern whether fixing the exchange rate was part of the stabilization package at the time of the inflation decline. I follow Calvo and Vegh's rule that a country must have at least current account convertibility to be classified as exchange rate based. This excludes several low-income economies like Bangladesh and Ghana that had fixed official exchange rates at times, but also had large black market premia on foreign exchange and hence nothing resembling current account convertibility. l There are 9 exchange-rate-based stabilizations out of the 28 episodes according to these criteria: Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Iceland (second), Israel, Mexico, Nicaragua, Uruguay (both). Reinhart and Vegh (1995) , in a sample of ERBS that includes all of these except Ecuador, Iceland and Nicaragua, find that output growth is positive in the first several years of stabilization. 
Do expansions always follow contractions?
Is output just snapping back after a particularly disastrous but temporary collapse, perhaps due to a war or some other exogenous cause? As one of my colleagues at the World Bank likes to put it, even dead cats bounce.
Trying to resolve the time-series properties of output is a big subject, and one beyond the scope of this paper. But I can check whether all countries with negative growth, regardless of whether they had inflation crises, subsequently had the same kind of output recovery as the 'expansionary stabilizations'. To do this, I define a 'growth crisis' to pick out all countries with negative growth, analogous to the negative growth of the prestabilization years for countries with inflation crises. I pick out all countries, apart from the inflation crisis countries, that have had three straight years of negative per-capita growth. This criterion picks out no fewer than 63 countries with negative growth episodes, where years -2 to 0 are the three years of negative growth. Figure 10 shows the recovery, or more accurately the non-recovery, of output following these negative growth episodes. For comparison, Figure 10 overlays the pattern of output recovery following inflation reduction. Growth following stabilization is higher than growth following generic output declines. There is no mechanical tendency for rapid positive growth after an episode of negative growth. 
OTHER EVIDENCE: HISTORICAL AND EX-COMMUNIST EXAMPLES

Transition countries confirm previous findings
the two world wars.12 The historical experience after the wars is obviously a prime candidate for the bounce-back effect and/or reverse causality -the severe drop in output had a lot to do with the generation of the inflation crisis, and it was inevitable that output would recover at some point. Despite all this, the postwar stabilizations have attracted some attention in the literature as a laboratory for the output effects of stabilization, so perhaps it is worth pointing out that in Table 3 economies in Table 4 from other transition economies, as shown in Table 5 . Growth during the high-inflation crises has been much worse than the negative growth before inflation broke out, and growth has improved markedly in those countries that have stabilized compared to those that have not.13 These results also do not really say that stabilization is a free lunch. Rather it is just the return of the lunch that was taken away yesterday, during the high-inflation crisis, probably with your bread more stale. And underlying the ups and downs there may be all kinds of different winners and losers. Some fragmentary evidence about the historical hyperinflations suggests that employment does not recover as well as output after inflation crises; it is worth investigating further whether this is a general phenomenon with the recent crises.
INTERPRETATIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Causality is a general problem with interpreting high-inflation and stabilization experiences, and it is certainly a problem with interpreting expansionary stabilization. Causality problems are broader than just the possible two-way feedback between inflation and growth. One of the insights of Dornbusch et al. (1990) was that everything becomes endogenous in high inflations -budget deficits, money supply, length of pay period, indexation mechanisms, financial technology, etc. It is hard under such circumstances to be very confident about identifying structural relationships between policy levers and economic outcomes.
In any case, observing a consistent direction of association helps us to narrow the set of possible stories that explain these Stabilization is no free lunch outcomes, and thus gives some guide to policy. For example, the evidence is inconsistent with the traditional view that high inflation is an expansionary shift of aggregate demand, and that stabilization is a contractionary shift back of aggregate demand.
To the question of why policy-makers are not exploiting the win-win opportunities of stabilization from high inflation more often, one possible answer is that they in fact already do so whenever such opportunities exist. One interpretation of the war of attrition models, as already noted, is that interest groups wait until the gains from stabilization (equivalently, costs of further delay) are so large that one group will willingly bear the redistributive sacrifice associated with a stabilization. Since my results are based on stabilizations that do actually happen, I may be picking up these large gains that the Alesina-Drazen model predicts are necessary for stabilization to happen at all. I think this is a plausible story for the facts established here.
However, even if this is the correct interpretation, it looks like there would be short-run gains from stabilization if policymakers could find a way to end the war of attrition before getting to the growth trough. Even if I am cautious about causality, I think that disinflation is a pretty good bet for countries presently experiencing high inflation.
Discussion
Tryphon Kollintzas Athens Institute of Economic Policy Studies, Athens
This paper discusses several stylized facts of prolonged, highinflation episodes followed by prolonged, low-inflation periods, using annual data from 1960 to 1994 for a large number of countries. The major finding is that there is a strong negative correlation between inflation and output growth, with the former leading the latter by more than a year. The same seems to be true of a measure of total factor productivity. Capital growth (investment), while also negatively related, seems to lag inflation by more than two years. There is weaker evidence that deficits and money growth are reduced in the year of peak inflation.
The author then attempts to explain the phenomenon by a number of simple statistical tests. They seem to suggest that there is no difference between exchange-rate-based stabilizations and money-based stabilizations, which implies that policy changes may not be the primary cause of real economic activity. Wars and debt shocks seem to play an important role in the negative growth of output prior to stabilizations, which suggests that the mean reserval effect may be at play here.
I have no doubt about the validity of the stylized fact recognized in this paper. On the contrary, I think that the problem with the paper is that this stylized fact characterizes nonstabilization periods as well. There is considerable evidence from the real business cycle literature ( The literature on the optimal design of disinflationary policies has reached the general conclusion that in moderateinflation countries it is hard to avoid enduring some short-run output costs when trying to lower inflation. Nevertheless, some research and experience suggests that forceful, rapid and credible disinflationary strategies are more successful in bringing down inflation at lower short-term output costs. As far as high-inflation countries are concerned, there is some consensus that stopping chronic inflation is costly either earlier or later in the disinflationary period, depending on whether there are 'money' or 'exchange rate' based stabilizations. Only in extreme cases of hyperinflation does it seem possible to bring inflation down significantly, with zero or little short-run output cost. The paper by Easterly challenges the traditional pessimistic view about the short-run costs of bringing down inflation, and concludes, at least for high-inflation countries, that: (1) in practice, durable disinflation has been accompanied by better, not worse, output performance; (2) this effect has been fairly immediate, following the implementation of stabilization plans; and (3) the initial output expansion has not been followed by a contraction later on, as inflation was being abated.
These results come from analysing a sample containing 28 successful inflation stabilization episodes, where success is defined as inflation falling below 40%, during at least two consecutive years. The methodology used is based not on sophisticated econometrics, but rather on the presentation of a number of graphs describing the average behaviour of certain variables over time, and several regressions.
I think that, in spite of this simple methodology, the author has been very careful in taking into account some of the most important criticisms that might be made, ranging from the dating of inflation stabilization episodes to accounting for relative growth effects. Still, while I believe that the empirical evidence provided by Easterly is convincing overall, I would like to raise a few points about the robustness of his results.
A first point concerns the sample selection procedure used in the paper. The author selects those episodes where disinflationary programmes were successful in bringing down inflation over a certain period, and the result that stopping inflation comes with better (and not worse) output performance relies on this selection. Consequently, he explicitly excludes those episodes where stabilization programmes were introduced and subsequently abandoned (thus leading to an inflation rebound) because they caused short-run output costs that made them politically unsustainable.
While taking these excluded episodes into account would certainly not alter Easterly's conclusion that successful inflation stabilizations are expansionary, it might increase our doubts that attempting to lower inflation will be expansionary in the short run. In this regard, an interesting issue is what makes some stabilization programmes more successful than others in bringing high inflation down at low output costs. A second point is that, while the author relies on 'averaging procedures' to support his conclusions, he is careful to point out that disinflations are not always associated with an early output expansion. I would like to shed some light on what 'not always' means with the help of the individual country-specific data, so as to extract some of the 'country-by-country' richness which gets obscured when averaging. I find that the output response in year 1 is favourable (relative to output performance before the introduction of the stabilization plan) in 18 out of the 28 cases considered, and unfavourable in 10 cases. This suggests that a short-run worsening of output conditions happened more often than the means and medians represented in the figures lead us to believe. Furthermore, when we investigate what happens not just in year 1 but, say, over the first three years after the introduction of the stabilization programme, the outcome is still unfavourable in 6 out of the 10 cases mentioned above. Tables  1 and 2. The 'equation' behind Table 1 has only dummies as explanatory variables. This approach can be criticized as using an unspecified equation which is subject to the omitted variables bias problem. This is, I think, exemplified by the fact that the inclusion of 'war and debt' variables in Table 2 It is evident that, if Easterly's results are correct, whatever aggregate demand does, supply must expand, and furthermore this expansion must dominate any demand effects so as simultaneously to deliver better inflation and output performance. In the latter part of the paper, the author tries to shed some light on this important issue by exploring how the aggregate supply and demand schedules are affected during inflation stabilization episodes. Nevertheless, his findings, although informative, fall short of being a complete and fully satisfactory explanation. As far as the supply side is concerned, his main conclusion is that the immediate output supply expansion is due to an increase in total factor productivity. Still, since total factor productivity is derived as a residual, it is a sort of black box, and while we can conjecture that ending high inflation helps economic efficiency, we do not know exactly why. As for demand, neither consumption nor investment is found to lead the recovery after inflation stabilization, and while there is some evidence of the favourable effects associated with the 'end of wars' and 'debt relief, this is not enough to explain all cases.
My third point relates to the averages or regressions in
My own impression is that a more successful method of identifying the main channels through which stabilization programmes operate is the systematic comparison of in-depth case studies. For this, it is necessary to investigate in detail in each of the selected countries the nature of the inflationary process and the key components of stabilization programmes, and to incorporate several other macroeconomic variables in the analysis (e.g. real exchange rates and real interest rates).
To conclude, Easterly's empirical results are very interesting by themselves. They help us to narrow the set of models linking inflation and output behaviour in the short run which are consistent with the data, and they are certainly good news for policy-makers. However, the results still need to be explained satisfactorily if policy-makers are to benefit from them when designing inflation stabilization programmes.
General discussion
A substantial part of the discussion was on methodological issues. The definition of a crisis as a period of sustained inflation above 40% per annum drew considerable attention. Klaus F. Zimmermann thought that the choice of the 40% threshold was arbitrary and the sample size small, especially in the face of a potential selection bias generated by concentrating on successful stabilizations. Alan Kirman pointed out that choosing a lower threshold would have picked up more observations in the sample, making the results more robust. Paul Geroski felt that, while stabilizations from crises of this magnitude may well be expansionary, it was worth examining whether this relationship was preserved if alternative thresholds, especially lower ones, were used to identify crises. William Easterly responded by drawing upon some previous research, which suggested that the results were not as strong if lower thresholds were used. Alan Manning questioned the quality of the data for some of the countries in the sample, and drew attention to the possibility of large measurement errors. These, he felt, could have biased the results in a significant way. For instance, if real output growth is derived as nominal output growth minus the inflation rate, and there are large measurement errors in each, the correlation between real output growth and inflation could be spuriously negative. As the method of sample selection, looking at episodes in which there are sharp upswings in inflation, is likely to pick up precisely those countries for which the problem of measurement error is particularly severe, this was a serious shortcoming. Alan Kirman argued that the statistical problems of measurement are compounded by the actual disruption of some production activity in high-inflation economies. Frequently shops suspend trading, and people hold on to resources rather than produce, when inflation is high and uncertain. He was also concerned about the averaging process used in the analysis, which attached equal weights to all observations in a sample that included some peculiar cases.
Andres Velasco argued that it is stabilizations that are ex ante non-credible, and for that reason eventually unsuccessful, which tend to be most expansionary. This could happen if the interest rate effect associated with the supposedly temporary fall in inflation prompts people to bring consumption forward in time. Some of the episodes in the sample (in particular Chile) were instances of unsuccessful stabilization, and could have been expansionary purely for that reason. This should lead us to look at the expansionary effect as a sign of failure rather than a virtue of stabilization programmes.
Andre Sapir wondered if the main result (that stabilizations tend to be expansionary) could be an artefact of the manner in which the model located the origin of stabilization programmes in relation to the time series of macro variables. In the model, the initiation of a stabilization programme was taken to coincide with the peak in the inflation series. Suppose, instead, that stabilization programmes begin earlier or, equivalently, that inflation peaks one or more periods after a stabilization programme is put in place. Given the statistically observed decline in output in the years just before the inflation peak, one might then legitimately conclude that stabilizations are contractionary, at least in the initial stages. William Easterly clarified that other information on the timing of stabilization programmes, such as the date of new policy announcements, did not suggest that stabilizations start very much earlier than the analysis claimed.
Moving on to the policy implications, Francesco Giavazzi noted that the suggested relationship between inflation reduction and output growth was similar in spirit to the idea that public debt reduction tends to boost output. The empirical verification of these claimed relationships was interesting as a statistical exercise, but their policy significance was not very clear. The more interesting policy issue was how one reduces inflation. In a similar vein, Paul Grout thought that the result was akin to finding out that winning a lottery makes one rich: that, by itself, says little about the wisdom of buying lottery tickets. For a more complete judgement, one needed to look not only at successful stabilizations, but at the unsuccessful ones as well. He also speculated on the difficulty of determining if the success of a particular stabilization was due to sound policy, or just to good fortune.
Axel Weber felt that, when considering inflation reduction, it was important to examine the underlying causes of inflation. Was it systemic in the sense of being a consequence of wage indexation schemes and the like, or did it have monetary or fiscal origins? Further, the analysis showed that inflation reduction from very high levels to moderate levels is expansionary, but that further reduction from intermediate to low levels could be costly in terms of output: this implies that there must exist some optimal degree of inflation reduction from the viewpoint of maximizing output. William Easterly concurred, and pointed out that many stabilization programmes eased their anti-inflationary efforts after they succeeded in reducing inflation below 20%.
